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An
Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States
National Security October
2003 By Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall Imagining
the Unthinkable The
purpose of this report is to imagine the unthinkable – to push the
boundaries of current research
on climate change so we may better understand the potential implications
on United States
national security. We
have interviewed leading climate change scientists, conducted additional
research, and reviewed
several iterations of the scenario with these experts. The scientists
support this project,
but caution that the scenario depicted is extreme in two fundamental
ways. First, they
suggest the occurrences we outline would most likely happen in a few
regions, rather than
on globally. Second, they say the magnitude of the event may be
considerably smaller. We
have created a climate change scenario that although not the most
likely, is plausible, and would
challenge United States national security in ways that should be
considered immediately. Executive
Summary There
is substantial evidence to indicate that significant global warming will
occur during
the 21st
century.
Because changes have been gradual so far, and are projected to
be similarly gradual in the future, the effects of global warming have
the potential to
be manageable for most nations. Recent research, however, suggests that
there is a possibility
that this gradual global warming could lead to a relatively abrupt
slowing of
the ocean’s thermohaline conveyor, which could lead to harsher winter
weather conditions,
sharply reduced soil moisture, and more intense winds in certain regions that
currently provide a significant fraction of the world’s food
production. With inadequate
preparation, the result could be a significant drop in the human
carrying capacity
of the Earth’s environment. The
research suggests that once temperature rises above some threshold,
adverse weather
conditions could develop relatively abruptly, with persistent changes in
the atmospheric
circulation causing drops in some regions of 5-10 degrees Fahrenheit in a
single decade. Paleoclimatic evidence suggests that altered climatic
patterns could last
for as much as a century, as they did when the ocean conveyor collapsed
8,200 years
ago, or, at the extreme, could last as long as 1,000 years as they did
during the Younger
Dryas, which began about 12,700 years ago. Abrupt
Climate Change 2 In
this report, as an alternative to the scenarios of gradual climatic
warming that are so
common, we outline an abrupt climate change scenario patterned after the
100- year
event that occurred about 8,200 years ago. This abrupt change scenario
is characterized
by the following conditions: ·
Annual
average temperatures drop by up to 5 degrees Fahrenheit over Asia and
North America and 6 degrees Fahrenheit in northern Europe ·
Annual
average temperatures increase by up to 4 degrees Fahrenheit in key areas
throughout Australia, South America, and southern Africa. ·
Drought
persists for most of the decade in critical agricultural regions and in the
water resource regions for major population centers in Europe and
eastern North
America. ·
Winter
storms and winds intensify, amplifying the impacts of the changes. Western
Europe and the North Pacific experience enhanced winds. The
report explores how such an abrupt climate change scenario could
potentially de-stabilize
the geo-political environment, leading to skirmishes, battles, and even war
due to resource constraints such as: 1)
Food shortages due to decreases in net global agricultural production 2)
Decreased availability and quality of fresh water in key regions due to
shifted precipitation
patters, causing more frequent floods and droughts 3)
Disrupted access to energy supplies due to extensive sea ice and
storminess As
global and local carrying capacities are reduced, tensions could mount
around the world,
leading to two fundamental strategies: defensive and offensive. Nations
with the
resources to do so may build virtual fortresses around their countries,
preserving resources
for themselves. Less fortunate nations especially those with ancient enmities
with their neighbors, may initiate in struggles for access to food,
clean water,
or energy. Unlikely alliances could be formed as defense priorities
shift and the
goal is resources for survival rather than religion, ideology, or
national honor. This
scenario poses new challenges for the United States, and suggests
several steps to
be taken: ·
Improve
predictive climate models to allow investigation of a wider range of scenarios
and to anticipate how and where changes could occur ·
Assemble
comprehensive predictive models of the potential impacts of abrupt climate
change to improve projections of how climate could influence food, water,
and energy ·
Create
vulnerability metrics to anticipate which countries are most vulnerable to
climate change and therefore, could contribute materially to an
increasingly disorderly
and potentially violent world. Abrupt
Climate Change 3 ·
Identify
no-regrets strategies such as enhancing capabilities for water management ·
Rehearse
adaptive responses ·
Explore
local implications ·
Explore
geo-engineering options that control the climate. There
are some indications today that global warming has reached the threshold where
the thermohaline circulation could start to be significantly impacted.
These indications
include observations documenting that the North Atlantic is increasingly being
freshened by melting glaciers, increased precipitation, and fresh water
runoff making
it substantially less salty over the past 40 years. This
report suggests that, because of the potentially dire consequences, the
risk of abrupt
climate change, although uncertain and quite possibly small, should be elevated
beyond a scientific debate to a U.S. national security concern. Climate
Change Cold Dry Storms Reduction
in Carrying Capacity Food Water Energy National
Security Implications Border
management Global
conflict Economic
malaise Abrupt Climate Change 4 An
Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States
National Security October
2003 Introduction When
most people think about climate change, they imagine gradual increases
in temperature
and only marginal changes in other climatic conditions, continuing indefinitely
or even leveling off at some time in the future. The conventional wisdom is
that modern civilization will either adapt to whatever weather
conditions we face and
that the pace of climate change will not overwhelm the adaptive capacity
of society,
or that our efforts such as those embodied in the Kyoto protocol will be sufficient
to mitigate the impacts. The IPCC documents the threat of gradual
climate change
and its impact to food supplies and other resources of importance to
humans will
not be so severe as to create security threats. Optimists assert that
the benefits from
technological innovation will be able to outpace the negative effects of
climate change. Climatically,
the gradual change view of the future assumes that agriculture will continue
to thrive and growing seasons will lengthen. Northern Europe, Russia,
and North
America will prosper agriculturally while southern Europe, Africa, and Central
and South America will suffer from increased dryness, heat, water
shortages, and
reduced production. Overall, global food production under many typical
climate scenarios
increases. This view of climate change may be a dangerous act of
selfdeception, as
increasingly we are facing weather related disasters -- more hurricanes, monsoons,
floods, and dry-spells – in regions around the world. Weather-related
events have an enormous impact on society, as they influence food supply,
conditions in cities and communities, as well as access to clean water
and energy.
For example, a recent report by the Climate Action Network of Australia projects
that climate change is likely to reduce rainfall in the rangelands,
which could lead
to a 15 per cent drop in grass productivity. This, in turn, could lead
to reductions
in the average weight of cattle by 12 per cent, significantly reducing
beef supply.
Under such conditions, dairy cows are projected to produce 30% less
milk, and
new pests are likely to spread in fruit-growing areas. Additionally,
such conditions
are projected to lead to 10% less water for drinking. Based on model projections
of coming change conditions such as these could occur in several food producing
regions around the world at the same time within the next 15-30years, challenging
the notion that society’s ability to adapt will make climate change manageable. Abrupt
Climate Change 5 With
over 400 million people living in drier, subtropical, often
over-populated and economically
poor regions today, climate change and its follow-on effects pose a severe
risk to political, economic, and social stability. In less prosperous
regions, where
countries lack the resources and capabilities required to adapt quickly
to more severe
conditions, the problem is very likely to be exacerbated. For some
countries, climate
change could become such a challenge that mass emigration results as the desperate
peoples seek better lives in regions such as the United States that have
the resources
to adaptation. Because
the prevailing scenarios of gradual global warming could cause effects
like the
ones described above, an increasing number of business leaders,
economists, policy
makers, and politicians are concerned about the projections for further
change and
are working to limit human influences on the climate. But, these efforts
may not be
sufficient or be implemented soon enough. Rather
than decades or even centuries of gradual warming, recent evidence
suggests the
possibility that a more dire climate scenario may actually be unfolding.
This is why
GBN is working with OSD to develop a plausible scenario for abrupt
climate change
that can be used to explore implications for food supply, health and
disease, commerce
and trade, and their consequences for national security. While
future weather patterns and the specific details of abrupt climate
change cannot
be predicted accurately or with great assurance, the actual history of
climate change
provides some useful guides. Our goal is merely to portray a plausible scenario,
similar to one which has already occurred in human experieince, for
which there
is reasonable evidence so that we may further explore potential
implications for United
States national security. Creating
the Scenario: Reviewing History Abrupt
Climate Change 6 The
above graphic, derived from sampling of an ice core in Greenland, shows
a historical
tendency for particular regions to experience periods of abrupt cooling within
periods of general warming.1 The
Cooling Event 8,200 Years Ago The
climate change scenario outlined in this report is modeled on a
century-long climate
event that records from an ice core in Greenland indicate occurred 8,200 years
ago. Immediately following an extended period of warming, much like the phase
we appear to be in today, there was a sudden cooling . Average annual temperatures
in Greenland dropped by roughly 5 degrees Fahrenheit, and temperature
decreases nearly this large are likely to have occurred throughout the North
Atlantic region. During the 8,200 event severe winters in Europe and
some other
areas caused glaciers to advance, rivers to freeze, and agricultural
lands to be less
productive. Scientific evidence suggests that this event was associated
with, and perhaps
caused by, a collapse of the ocean’s conveyor following a period of
gradual warming. Longer
ice core and oceanic records suggest that there may have been as many as eight
rapid cooling episodes in the past 730,000 years, and sharp reductions
in the ocean
conveyer--a phenomenon that may well be on the horizon – are a likely suspect
in causing such shifts in climate. The
Younger Dryas About
12,700 years ago, also associated with an apparent collapse of the thermohaline
circulation, there was a cooling of at least 27 degrees Fahrenheit in Greenland,
and substantial change throughout the North Atlantic region as well,
this time
lasting 1,300 years. The remarkable feature of the Younger Dryas event
was that it
happened in a series of decadal drops of around 5 degrees, and then the
cold, dry weather
persisted for over 1,000 years. While this event had an enormous effect
on the
ocean and land surrounding Europe (causing icebergs to be found as far
south as the
coast of Portugal), its impact would be more severe today – in our
densely populated
society. It is the more recent periods of cooling that appear to be intimately
connected with changes to civilization, unrest, inhabitability of once desirable
land, and even the demise of certain populations. The
Little Ice Age Beginning
in the 14th century, the North Atlantic region experienced a cooling
that lasted
until the mid-19th
century.
This cooling may have been caused by a significant slowing
of the ocean conveyor, although it is more generally thought that
reduced solar
output and/or volcanic eruptions may have prompted the oceanic changes. This
period, often referred to as the Little Ice Age, which lasted from 1300
to 1850, brought
severe winters, sudden climatic shifts, and profound agricultural,
economic, and
political impacts to Europe. 1
R.B. Alley, from The
Two Mile Time Machine, 2000. Abrupt
Climate Change 7 The
period was marked by persistent crop failures, famine, disease, and
population migration,
perhaps most dramatically felt by the Norse, also known as the Vikings, who
inhabited Iceland and later Greenland. Ice formations along the coast of Greenland
prevented merchants from getting their boats to Greenland and fisherman from
getting fish for entire winters. As a result, farmers were forced to
slaughter their
poorly fed livestock -- because of a lack of food both for the animals
and themselves
-- but without fish, vegetables, and grains, there was not enough food
to feed
the population. Famine,
caused in part by the more severe climatic conditions, is reported to
have caused
tens of thousands of deaths between 1315 and 1319 alone. The general
cooling also
apparently drove the Vikings out of Greenland -- and some say was a contributing
cause for that society’s demise. While
climate crises like the Little Ice Age aren’t solely responsible for
the death of civilizations,
it’s undeniable that they have a large impact on society. It has been
less than
175 years since 1 million people died due to the Irish Potato famine,
which also was
induced in part by climate change. A
Climate Change Scenario For the Future The
past examples of abrupt climate change suggest that it is prudent to
consider an abrupt
climate change scenario for the future as plausible, especially because
some recent
scientific findings suggest that we could be on the cusp of such an
event. The future
scenario that we have constructed is based on the 8,200 years before
present event,
which was much warmer and far briefer than the Younger Dryas, but more severe
than the Little Ice Age. This scenario makes plausible assumptions about which
parts of the globe are likely to be colder, drier, and windier. Although intensified
research could help to refine the assumptions, there is no way to
confirm the
assumptions on the basis of present models. Rather
than predicting how climate change will happen, our intent is to
dramatize the
impact climate change could have on society if we are unprepared for it.
Where we
describe concrete weather conditions and implications, our aim is to
further the strategic
conversation rather than to accurately forecast what is likely to happen
with a
high degree of certainty. Even the most sophisticated models cannot
predict the details
of how the climate change will unfold, which regions will be impacted in which
ways, and how governments and society might respond. However, there appears
to be general agreement in the scientific community that an extreme case
like the
one depicted below is not implausible. Many scientists would regard this scenario
as extreme both in how soon it develops, how large, rapid and ubiquitous the
climate changes are. But history tells us that sometimes the extreme
cases do occur,
there is evidence that it might be and it is DOD’s job to consider
such scenarios. Abrupt
Climate Change 8 Keep
in mind that the duration of this event could be decades, centuries, or
millennia and
it could begin this year or many years in the future. In the climate
change disruption
scenario proposed here, we consider a period of gradual warming leading to
2010 and then outline the following ten years, when like in the 8,200
event, an abrupt
change toward cooling in the pattern of weather conditions change is assumed
to occur. Warming
Up to 2010 Following
the most rapid century of warming experienced by modern civilization, the
first ten years of the 21st century see an acceleration of atmospheric
warming, as average
temperatures worldwide rise by .5 degrees Fahrenheit per decade and by
as much
as 2 degrees Fahrenheit per decade in the harder hit regions. Such
temperature changes
would vary both by region and by season over the globe, with these finer scale
variations being larger or smaller than the average change. What would
be very clear
is that the planet is continuing the warming trend of the late 20th
century. Most
of North America, Europe, and parts of South America experience 30% more days
with peak temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than they did a
century ago, with
far fewer days below freezing. In addition to the warming, there are
erratic weather
patterns: more floods, particularly in mountainous regions, and
prolonged droughts
in grain-producing and coastal-agricultural areas. In general, the
climate shift
is an economic nuisance, generally affecting local areas as storms,
droughts, and hot
spells impact agriculture and other climate-dependent activities. (More
French doctors
remain on duty in August, for example.) The weather pattern, though, is
not yet
severe enough or widespread enough to threaten the interconnected global society
or United States national security. Warming
Feedback Loops As
temperatures rise throughout the 20th
century
and into the early 2000s potent positive
feedback loops kick-in, accelerating the warming from .2 degrees
Fahrenheit, to
.4 and eventually .5 degrees Fahrenheit per year in some locations. As
the surface warms,
the hydrologic cycle (evaporation, precipitation, and runoff)
accelerates causing
temperatures to rise even higher. Water vapor, the most powerful natural greenhouse
gas, traps additional heat and brings average surface air temperatures up.
As evaporation increases, higher surface air temperatures cause drying
in forests and
grasslands, where animals graze and farmers grow grain. As trees die and
burn, forests
absorb less carbon dioxide, again leading to higher surface air
temperatures as
well as fierce and uncontrollable forest fires Further, warmer
temperatures melt snow
cover in mountains, open fields, high-latitude tundra areas, and
permafrost throughout
forests in cold-weather areas. With the ground absorbing more and reflecting
less of the sun’s rays, temperatures increase even higher. Abrupt
Climate Change 9 By
2005 the climatic impact of the shift is felt more intensely in certain
regions around
the world. More severe storms and typhoons bring about higher storm surges
and floods in low-lying islands such as Tarawa and Tuvalu (near New Zealand).
In 2007, a particularly severe storm causes the ocean to break through levees
in the Netherlands making a few key coastal cities such as The Hague unlivable.
Failures of the delta island levees in the Sacramento River region in
the Central
Valley of California creates an inland sea and disrupts the aqueduct
system transporting
water from northern to southern California because salt water can no longer
be kept out of the area during the dry season. Melting along the
Himalayan glaciers
accelerates, causing some Tibetan people to relocate. Floating ice in
the northern
polar seas, which had already lost 40% of its mass from 1970 to 2003, is mostly
gone during summer by 2010. As glacial ice melts, sea levels rise and as wintertime
sea extent decreases, ocean waves increase in intensity, damaging
coastal cities.
Additionally millions of people are put at risk of flooding around the
globe (roughly
4 times 2003 levels), and fisheries are disrupted as water temperature changes
cause fish to migrate to new locations and habitats, increasing tensions
over fishing
rights. Each
of these local disasters caused by severe weather impacts surrounding
areas whose
natural, human, and economic resources are tapped to aid in recovery.
The positive
feedback loops and acceleration of the warming pattern begin to trigger responses
that weren’t previously imagined, as natural disasters and stormy
weather occur
in both developed and lesser-developed nations. Their impacts are
greatest in less-resilient
developing nations, which do not have the capacity built into their social,
economic, and agricultural systems to absorb change. As
melting of the Greenland ice sheet exceeds the annual snowfall, and
there is increasing
freshwater runoff from high latitude precipitation, the freshening of waters
in the North Atlantic Ocean and the seas between Greenland and Europe increases.
The lower densities of these freshened waters in turn pave the way for a sharp
slowing of the thermohaline circulation system. The
Period from 2010 to 2020 Thermohaline
Circulation Collapse After
roughly 60 years of slow freshening, the thermohaline collapse begins in
2010, disrupting
the temperate climate of Europe, which is made possible by the warm flows
of the Gulf Stream (the North Atlantic arm of the global thermohaline conveyor).
Ocean circulation patterns change, bringing less warm water north and causing
an immediate shift in the weather in Northern Europe and eastern North America.
The North Atlantic Ocean continues to be affected by fresh water coming from
melting glaciers, Greenland’s ice sheet, and perhaps most importantly
increased rainfall
and runoff. Decades of high-latitude warming cause increased
precipitation and
bring additional fresh water to the salty, dense water in the North,
which is normally
affected mainly by warmer and saltier water from the Gulf Stream. That massive
current of warm water no longer reaches far into the North Atlantic. The immediate
climatic effect is cooler temperatures in Europe and throughout much of the
Northern Hemisphere and a dramatic drop in rainfall in many key
agricultural and
populated areas. However, the effects of the collapse will be felt in
fits and starts, as
the traditional weather patterns re-emerge only to be disrupted
again—for a full decade. The
dramatic slowing of the thermohaline circulation is anticipated by some
ocean researchers,
but the United States is not sufficiently prepared for its effects,
timing, or intensity.
Computer models of the climate and ocean systems, though improved, were
unable to produce sufficiently consistent and accurate information for policymakers.
As weather patterns shift in the years following the collapse, it is not clear
what type of weather future years will bring. While some forecasters
believe the cooling
and dryness is about to end, others predict a new ice age or a global
drought, leaving
policy makers and the public highly uncertain about the future climate
and what
to do, if anything. Is this merely a “blip” of little importance or
a fundamental change in the Earth’s climate, requiring an urgent massive human response? Abrupt
Climate Change 10 Cooler,
Drier, Windier Conditions for Continental Areas of the Northern
Hemisphere The
Weather Report: 2010-2020 ·
Drought
persists for the entire decade in critical agricultural regions and
in the areas around major population centers in Europe and eastern
North America. ·
Average
annual temperatures drop by up to 5 degrees Fahrenheit over Asia
and North America and up to 6 degrees Fahrenheit in Europe. ·
Temperatures
increase by up to 4 degrees Fahrenheit in key areas throughout
Australia, South America, and southern Africa. ·
Winter
storms and winds intensify, amplifying the impact of the changes.
Western Europe and the North Pacific face enhanced westerly
winds. Each
of the years from 2010-2020 sees average temperature drops throughout Northern
Europe, leading to as much as a 6 degree Fahrenheit drop in ten years. Average
annual rainfall in this region decreases by nearly 30%; and winds are up
to 15%
stronger on average. The climatic conditions are more severe in the
continental interior
regions of northern Asia and North America. Abrupt
Climate Change 11 The
effects of the drought are more devastating than the unpleasantness of temperature
decreases in the agricultural and populated areas. With the persistent reduction
of precipitation in these areas, lakes dry-up, river flow decreases, and
fresh water
supply is squeezed, overwhelming available conservation options and depleting
fresh water reserves. The Mega-droughts begin in key regions in Southern China
and Northern Europe around 2010 and last throughout the full decade. At
the same
time, areas that were relatively dry over the past few decades receive
persistent years
of torrential rainfall, flooding rivers, and regions that traditionally
relied on dryland
agriculture. In
the North Atlantic region and across northern Asia, cooling is most
pronounced in the
heart of winter -- December, January, and February -- although its
effects linger through
the seasons, the cooling becomes increasingly intense and less
predictable. As
snow accumulates in mountain regions, the cooling spreads to summertime.
In addition
to cooling and summertime dryness, wind pattern velocity strengthens as the
atmospheric circulation becomes more zonal. While
weather patterns are disrupted during the onset of the climatic change
around the
globe, the effects are far more pronounced in Northern Europe for the
first five years
after the thermohaline circulation collapse. By the second half of this
decade, the
chill and harsher conditions spread deeper into Southern Europe, North
America, and
beyond. Northern Europe cools as a pattern of colder weather lengthens
the time
that sea ice is present over the northern North Atlantic Ocean, creating
a further cooling
influence and extending the period of wintertime surface air
temperatures. Winds
pick up as the atmosphere tries to deal with the stronger
pole-to-equator temperature
gradient. Cold air blowing across the European continent causes especially
harsh conditions for agriculture. The combination of wind and dryness causes
widespread dust storms and soil loss. Signs
of incremental warming appear in the southern most areas along the
Atlantic Ocean,
but the dryness doesn’t let up. By the end of the decade, Europe’s
climate is more
like Siberia’s. An
Alternative Scenario for the Southern Hemisphere There
is considerable uncertainty about the climate dynamics of the Southern Hemisphere,
mainly due to less paleoclimatic data being available than for the Northern
Hemisphere. Weather patterns in key regions in the Southern Hemisphere could
mimic those of the Northern Hemisphere, becoming colder, drier, and more severe
as heat flows from the tropics to the Northern Hemisphere, trying to thermodynamically
balance the climatic system. Alternatively, the cooling of the Northern
Hemisphere may lead to increased warmth, precipitation, and storms in the
south, as the heat normally transported away from equatorial regions by
the ocean
currents becomes trapped and as greenhouse gas warming continues to accelerate.
Either way, it is not implausible that abrupt climate change will bring extreme
weather conditions to many of the world’s key population and growing regions at the same time – stressing global food, water, and energy supply. Abrupt
Climate Change 12 The
Regions: 2010 to 2020 Europe.
Hit hardest by the climatic change, average annual temperatures drop by
6 degrees
Fahrenheit in under a decade, with more dramatic shifts along the Northwest
coast. The climate in northwestern Europe is colder, drier, and windier, making
it more like Siberia. Southern Europe experiences less of a change but
still suffers
from sharp intermittent cooling and rapid temperature shifts. Reduced precipitation
causes soil loss to become a problem throughout Europe, contributing to
food supply shortages. Europe struggles to stem emigration out of
Scandinavian and
northern European nations in search of warmth as well as immigration
from hard-hit
countries in Africa and elsewhere. United
States.
Colder, windier, and drier weather makes growing seasons shorter and
less productive throughout the northeastern United States, and longer
and drier in
the southwest. Desert areas face increasing windstorms, while
agricultural areas suffer
from soil loss due to higher wind speeds and reduced soil moisture. The change
toward a drier climate is especially pronounced in the southern states. Abrupt
Climate Change 13 Coastal
areas that were at risk during the warming period remain at risk, as
rising ocean
levels continues along the shores. The United States turns inward,
committing its
resources to feeding its own population, shoring-up its borders, and
managing the increasing
global tension. China.
China,
with its high need for food supply given its vast population, is hit
hard by
a decreased reliability of the monsoon rains. Occasional monsoons during
the summer
season are welcomed for their precipitation, but have devastating
effects as they
flood generally denuded land. Longer, colder winters and hotter summers caused
by decreased evaporative cooling because of reduced precipitation stress already
tight energy and water supplies. Widespread famine causes chaos and internal
struggles as a cold and hungry China peers jealously across the Russian
and western
borders at energy resources. Bangladesh.
Persistent
typhoons and a higher sea level create storm surges that cause
significant coastal erosion, making much of Bangladesh nearly
uninhabitable. Further,
the rising sea level contaminates fresh water supplies inland, creating
a drinking
water and humanitarian crisis. Massive emigration occurs, causing
tension in
China and India, which are struggling to manage the crisis inside their
own boundaries. East
Africa. Kenya,
Tanzania, and Mozambique face slightly warmer weather, but are
challenged by persistent drought. Accustomed to dry conditions, these
countries were
the least influenced by the changing weather conditions, but their food
supply is
challenged as major grain producing regions suffer. Australia.
A
major food exporter, Australia struggles to supply food around the globe,
as its agriculture is not severely impacted by more subtle changes in
its climate.
But the large uncertainties about Southern Hemisphere climate change
make this
benign conclusion suspect. Impact
on Natural Resources The
changing weather patterns and ocean temperatures affect agriculture,
fish and wildlife,
water and energy. Crop yields, affected by temperature and water stress
as well
as length of growing season fall by 10-25% and are less predictable as
key regions
shift from a warming to a cooling trend. As some agricultural pests die
due to
temperature changes, other species spread more readily due to the
dryness and windiness
– requiring alternative pesticides or treatment regiments. Commercial fishermen
that typically have rights to fish in specific areas will be ill
equipped for the
massive migration of their prey. Abrupt
Climate Change 14 With
only five or six key grain-growing regions in the world (US, Australia, Argentina,
Russia, China, and India), there is insufficient surplus in global food supplies
to offset severe weather conditions in a few regions at the same time
– let alone
four or five. The world’s economic interdependence make the United
States increasingly
vulnerable to the economic disruption created by local weather shifts in key
agricultural and high population areas around the world. Catastrophic
shortages of
water and energy supply – both of which are stressed around the
globe today – cannot
be quickly overcome. Impact
on National Security Human
civilization began with the stabilization and warming of the Earth’s
climate. A
colder unstable climate meant that humans could neither develop
agriculture or permanent
settlements. With the end of the Younger Dryas and the warming and stabilization
that followed, humans could learn the rhythms of agriculture and settle in
places whose climate was reliably productive. Modern civilization has
never experienced
weather conditions as persistently disruptive as the ones outlined in
this scenario.
As a result, the implications for national security outlined in this
report are only
hypothetical. The actual impacts would vary greatly depending on the
nuances of
the weather conditions, the adaptability of humanity, and decisions by policymakers. Violence
and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in
the climate
pose a different type of threat to national security than we are
accustomed to today.
Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources
such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion,
or national honor. The shifting motivation for confrontation would alter which
countries are most vulnerable and the existing warning signs for
security threats. There
is a long-standing academic debate over the extent to which resource constraints
and environmental challenges lead to inter-state conflict. While some believe
they alone can lead nations to attack one another, others argue that
their primary
effect is to act as a trigger of conflict among countries that face
pre-existing social,
economic, and political tension. Regardless, it seems undeniable that
severe environmental
problems are likely to escalate the degree of global conflict. Co-founder
and President of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment,
and Security, Peter Gleick outlines the three most fundamental challenges
abrupt climate change poses for national security: 1.
Food shortages due to decreases in agricultural production 2.
Decreased availability and quality of fresh water due to flooding and
droughts 3.
Disrupted access to strategic minerals due to ice and storms Abrupt
Climate Change 15 In
the event of abrupt climate change, it’s likely that food, water, and
energy resource constraints
will first be managed through economic, political, and diplomatic means such
as treaties and trade embargoes. Over time though, conflicts over land
and water
use are likely to become more severe – and more violent. As states
become increasingly desperate, the pressure for action will grow. Decreasing
Carrying Capacity The
graphic shows how abrupt climate
change may cause human
carrying capacity to fall below
usage of the eco-system, suggesting
insufficient resources
leading to a contraction
of the population through
war, disease, and famine. Today,
carrying capacity, which is the ability for the Earth and its natural
ecosystems including
social, economic, and cultural systems to support the finite number of people
on the planet, is being challenged around the world. According to the International
Energy Agency, global demand for oil will grow by 66% in the next 30 years,
but it’s unclear where the supply will come from. Clean water is
similarly constrained
in many areas around the world. With 815 million people receiving insufficient
sustenance worldwide, some would say that as a globe, we’re living
well above
our carrying capacity, meaning there are not sufficient natural
resources to sustain
our behavior. Many
point to technological innovation and adaptive behavior as a means for managing
the global ecosystem. Indeed it has been technological progress that has increased
carrying capacity over time. Over centuries we have learned how to produce
more food, energy and access more water. But will the potential of new technologies
be sufficient when a crisis like the one outlined in this scenario hits? Abrupt
climate change is likely to stretch carrying capacity well beyond its
already precarious
limits. And there’s a natural tendency or need for carrying capacity
to become
realigned. As abrupt climate change lowers the world’s carrying
capacity aggressive
wars are likely to be fought over food, water, and energy. Deaths from war
as well as starvation and disease will decrease population size, which
overtime, will
re-balance with carrying capacity. Abrupt
Climate Change 16 When
you look at carrying capacity on a regional or state level it is
apparent that those
nations with a high carrying capacity, such as the United States and
Western Europe,
are likely to adapt most effectively to abrupt changes in climate,
because, relative
to their population size, they have more resources to call on. This may
give rise
to a more severe have, have-not mentality, causing resentment toward
those nations
with a higher carrying capacity. It may lead to finger-pointing and
blame, as the
wealthier nations tend to use more energy and emit more greenhouse
gasses such as
CO2 into the atmosphere. Less important than the scientifically proven relationship
between CO2 emissions and climate change is the perception that impacted
nations have – and the actions they take. The
Link Between Carrying Capacity and Warfare Steven
LeBlanc, Harvard archaeologist and author of a new book called Carrying Capacity,
describes the relationship between carrying capacity and warfare.
Drawing on
abundant archaeological and ethnological data, LeBlanc argues that
historically humans
conducted organized warfare for a variety of reasons, including warfare over
resources and the environment. Humans fight when they outstrip the
carrying capacity
of their natural environment. Every time there is a choice between
starving and
raiding, humans raid. From hunter/gatherers through agricultural tribes, chiefdoms,
and early complex societies, 25% of a population’s adult males die
when war
breaks out. Peace
occurs when carrying capacity goes up, as with the invention of
agriculture, newly
effective bureaucracy, remote trade and technological breakthroughs.
Also a large
scale die-back such as from plague can make for peaceful times---Europe
after its
major plagues, North American natives after European diseases decimated
their populations
(that's the difference between the Jamestown colony failure and Plymouth
Rock success). But such peaceful periods are short-lived because population
quickly rises to once again push against carrying capacity, and warfare resumes.
Indeed, over the millennia most societies define themselves according to their
ability to conduct war, and warrior culture becomes deeply ingrained.
The most
combative societies are the ones that survive. However
in the last three centuries, LeBlanc points out, advanced states have steadily
lowered the body count even though individual wars and genocides have grown
larger in scale. Instead of slaughtering all their enemies in the
traditional way,
for example, states merely kill enough to get a victory and then put the survivors
to work in their newly expanded economy. States also use their own bureaucracies,
advanced technology, and international rules of behavior to raise carrying
capacity and bear a more careful relationship to it. All
of that progressive behavior could collapse if carrying capacities
everywhere were
suddenly lowered drastically by abrupt climate change. Humanity would revert
to its norm of constant battles for diminishing resources, which the
battles themselves
would further reduce even beyond the climatic effects. Once again warfare would define human life. Conflict Scenario Due to Climate Change Europe Asia United States 2010-2020 2012: Severe drought and cold push Scandinavian populations southward, push back from EU 2015: Conflict within the EU over food and water supply leads to skirmishes and strained diplomatic relations 2018: Russia joins EU, providing energy resources 2020: Migration from northern countries such as Holland and Germany toward Spain and Italy 2010: Border skirmishes and conflict in Bangladesh, India, and China, as mass migration occurs toward Burma 2012: Regional instability leads Japan to develop force projection capability 2015: Strategic agreement between Japan and Russia for Siberia and Sakhalin energy resources 2018: China intervenes in Kazakhstan to protect pipelines regularly disrupted by rebels and criminals. 2010: Disagreements with Canada and Mexico over water increase tension 2012: Flood of refugees to southeast U.S. and Mexico from Caribbean islands 2015: European migration to United States (mostly wealthy) 2016: Conflict with European countries over fishing rights 2018: Securing North America, U.S. forms integrated security alliance with Canada and Mexico 2020: Department of Defense manages borders and refugees from Caribbean and Europe. 2020-2030 2020: Increasing: skirmishes over water and immigration 2022: Skirmish between France and Germany over commercial access to Rhine 2025: EU nears collapse 2027: Increasing migration to Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel 2030: Nearly 10% of European population 2020: Persistent conflict in South East Asia; Burma, Laos, Vietnam, India, China 2025: Internal conditions in China deteriorate dramatically leading to civil war and border wars. 2030: Tension growing between China and Japan over Russian energy * 2020: Oil prices increase as security of supply is threatened by conflicts in Persian Gulf and Caspian 2025: Internal struggle in Saudi Arabia brings Chinese and U.S. naval forces to Gulf ,in direct confrontation Abrupt Climate Change 18 moves to a different country The chart above outlines some potential military implications of climate change The
two most likely reactions to a sudden drop in carrying capacity due to
climate change
are defensive and offensive. The
United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses
around their countries
because they have the resources and reserves to achieve
self-sufficiency. With
diverse growing climates, wealth, technology, and abundant resources,
the United
States could likely survive shortened growing cycles and harsh weather conditions
without catastrophic losses. Borders will be strengthened around the country
to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially
severe problem), Mexico, and South America. Energy supply will be shored
up through expensive (economically, politically, and morally)
alternatives such
as nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and Middle Eastern contracts. Pesky skirmishes
over fishing rights, agricultural support, and disaster relief will be commonplace.
Tension between the U.S. and Mexico rise as the U.S. reneges on the 1944
treaty that guarantees water flow from the Colorado River. Relief
workers will be
commissioned to respond to flooding along the southern part of the east
coast and much
drier conditions inland. Yet, even in this continuous state of emergency
the U.S.
will be positioned well compared to others. The intractable problem
facing the nation
will be calming the mounting military tension around the world. As
famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to the abrupt
climate change,
many countries’ needs will exceed their carrying capacity. This will
create a sense
of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression in order
to reclaim
balance. Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations
with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population
is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy
supply. Or,
picture Japan, suffering from flooding along its coastal cities and
contamination of
its fresh water supply, eying Russia’s Sakhalin Island oil and gas
reserves as an energy
source to power desalination plants and energy-intensive agricultural processes.
Envision Pakistan, India, and China – all armed with nuclear weapons
– skirmishing
at their borders over refugees, access to shared rivers, and arable
land. Spanish
and Portuguese fishermen might fight over fishing rights – leading to conflicts
at sea. And, countries including the United States would be likely to
better secure
their borders. With over 200 river basins touching multiple nations, we
can expect
conflict over access to water for drinking, irrigation, and
transportation. The Danube
touches twelve nations, the Nile runs though nine, and the Amazon runs through
seven. Abrupt
Climate Change 19 In
this scenario, we can expect alliances of convenience. The United States
and Canada
may become one, simplifying border controls. Or, Canada might keep its hydropower—causing
energy problems in the US. North and South Korea may align to
create one technically savvy and nuclear-armed entity. Europe may act as
a unified
block – curbing immigration problems between European nations – and allowing
for protection against aggressors. Russia, with its abundant minerals,
oil, and
natural gas may join Europe. In
this world of warring states, nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable.
As cooling drives
up demand, existing hydrocarbon supplies are stretched thin. With a
scarcity of
energy supply – and a growing need for access -- nuclear energy will
become a critical
source of power, and this will accelerate nuclear proliferation as
countries develop
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national
security. China,
India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, France, and Germany
will all
have nuclear weapons capability, as will Israel, Iran, Egypt, and North
Korea. Managing
the military and political tension, occasional skirmishes, and threat of
war will
be a challenge. Countries such as Japan, that have a great deal of
social cohesion (meaning
the government is able to effectively engage its population in changing behavior)
are most likely to fair well. Countries whose diversity already produces conflict,
such as India, South Africa and Indonesia, will have trouble maintaining order.
Adaptability and access to resources will be key. Perhaps the most
frustrating challenge
abrupt climate change will pose is that we’ll never know how far we
are into
the climate change scenario and how many more years – 10, 100, 1000
--- remain before
some kind of return to warmer conditions as the thermohaline circulation starts
up again. When carrying capacity drops suddenly, civilization is faced
with new
challenges that today seem unimaginable. Could
This Really Happen? Ocean,
land, and atmosphere scientists at some of the world’s most
prestigious organizations
have uncovered new evidence over the past decade suggesting that the plausibility
of severe and rapid climate change is higher than most of the scientific community
and perhaps all of the political community is prepared for. If it
occurs, this
phenomenon will disrupt current gradual global warming trends, adding to climate
complexity and lack of predictability. And paleoclimatic evidence
suggests that
such an abrupt climate change could begin in the near future. The
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute reports that seas surrounding the
North Atlantic
have become less salty in the past 40 years, which in turn freshens the
deep ocean
in the North Atlantic. This trend could pave the way for ocean conveyor collapse
or slowing and abrupt climate change. Abrupt
Climate Change 20 34.96 34.94 34.92 34.90 34.88 34.86 34.84 34.82 34.80 1970
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Representational
Graph SALINITY
MEDIAN YEAR Northeast
Atlantic Denmark
Strait Labrador
Sea The
above graphic shows early evidence that a thermohaline circulation
collapse may be imminent, as
the North Atlantic is increasingly being freshened by surrounding seas
that have become less salty
over the past 40 years.2 2
Adapted from I
Yashayaev, Bedford Institute of Oceanography as seen in Abrupt Climate
Change, Inevitable Surprises,
National Research Council. Abrupt
Climate Change 21 The
above two headlines appeared in Nature Magazine in 2001 and 2002,
respectively. They suggest
that the North Atlantic salinity level may lower, increasing the
likelihood of a thermohaline
circulation collapse. With
at least eight abrupt climate change events documented in the geological record,
it seems that the questions to ask are: When will this happen? What
will the impacts
be? And, how can we best prepare for it? Rather
than: Will this really happen? Are
we prepared for history to repeat itself again? There
is a debate in newspapers around the globe today on the impact of human activity
on climate change. Because economic prosperity is correlated with energy use
and greenhouse gas emissions, it is often argued that economic progress
leads to climate
change. Competing evidence suggests that climate change can occur, regardless
of human activity as seen in climate events that happened prior to
modern society. It’s
important to understand human impacts on the environment – both
what’s done to
accelerate and decelerate (or perhaps even reverse) the tendency toward
climate change.
Alternative fuels, greenhouse gas emission controls, and conservation
efforts are
worthwhile endeavors. In addition, we should prepare for the inevitable
effects of
abrupt climate change – which will likely come regardless of human
activity. Here
are some preliminary recommendations to prepare the United States for
abrupt climate
change: 1)
Improve predictive climate models. Further
research should be conducted so more
confidence can be placed in predictions about climate change. There needs
to be a deeper understanding of the relationship between ocean patterns
and climate change. This research should focus on historical, current, and
predictive forces, and aim to further our understanding of abrupt
climate change,
how it may happen, and how we’ll know it’s occurring. 2)
Assemble comprehensive predictive models of climate change impacts. Substantial
research should be done on the potential ecological, economic, social,
and political impact of abrupt climate change. Sophisticated models and
scenarios should be developed to anticipate possible local conditions. A system
should be created to identify how climate change may impact the global
distribution of social, economic, and political power. These analyses can
be used to mitigate potential sources of conflict before they happen. 3)
Create vulnerability metrics. Metrics
should be created to understand a country’s
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Metrics may include climatic
impact on existing agricultural, water, and mineral resources; technical
capability; social cohesion and adaptability. Abrupt
Climate Change 22 4)
Identify no-regrets strategies.
No-regrets strategies should be identified and implemented
to ensure reliable access to food supply and water, and to ensure national
security. 5)
Rehearse adaptive responses. Adaptive
response teams should be established to
address and prepare for inevitable climate driven events such as massive migration,
disease and epidemics, and food and water supply shortages. 6)
Explore local implications. The
first-order effects of climate change are local. While
we can anticipate changes in pest prevalence and severity and changes in
agricultural productivity, one has to look at very specific locations
and conditions
to know which pests are of concern, which crops and regions are vulnerable,
and how severe impacts will be. Such studies should be undertaken,
particularly in strategically important food producing regions. 7)
Explore geo-engineering options that control the climate.
Today, it is easier to
warm than to cool the climate, so it might be possible to add various
gases, such
as hydrofluorocarbons, to the atmosphere to offset the affects of
cooling. Such
actions, of course, would be studied carefully, as they have the
potential to
exacerbate conflicts among nations. Conclusion It
is quite plausible that within a decade the evidence of an imminent
abrupt climate shift
may become clear and reliable. It is also possible that our models will
better enable
us to predict the consequences. In that event the United States will
need to take
urgent action to prevent and mitigate some of the most significant
impacts. Diplomatic
action will be needed to minimize the likelihood of conflict in the most impacted
areas, especially in the Caribbean and Asia. However, large population movements
in this scenario are inevitable. Learning how to manage those populations,
border tensions that arise and the resulting refugees will be critical. New
forms of security agreements dealing specifically with energy, food and
water will
also be needed. In short, while the US itself will be relatively better
off and with more
adaptive capacity, it will find itself in a world where Europe will be
struggling internally,
large number so refugees washing up on its shores and Asia in serious crisis
over food and water. Disruption and conflict will be endemic features of
life. http://www.ems.org/climate/pentagon_climate_change.pdf |




